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THE DUTY AND LIABILITY OF BANK DIRECTORS.*
I. As directors owe their official existence to positive law or
statute, so by statute are their duties and liabilities defined and
enforced. But when their conduct is fraudulent, they are liable,
regardless of any statute, primarily to the bank,' and secondarily
to its creditors, whom they have defrauded. In many States also
they are liable to the bank, its stockholders and creditors for negli-
gence so great that it cannot be overlooked or excused even thougl
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'Vose v. Grant, i5 Mass. 505, 519; Smith v. Hurd, T2 Met. (Mass.)
371; Bartholomew v. Bentley. i Ohio 659; Smith v. Poor, 40 Me. 415;
Allen v. Curtis. 26 Conn. 460; Winter v. Baker. 34 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 183:
Watts's Appeal, 78 Pa. 370; Warren v. Hopkins, iii Pa. 328; Zinn v.
Mendel. 9 W. Va. 580; Minton v. Stahlman, 96 Ten. 98; Deadrick v.
Bank. Too Tenn. 457; Gores v. Day, 99 Wis. 276, 278.
2Deadrick v. Bank. To Tenn. 457: Minton v. Stahlman, g6 Tenn. 98;
Duffy v. Byrne. 7 Mo. App. 417; Fusz v. Spaunhorst, 67 Mo. 256; Gores
v. Day, 99 Wis. 276.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
untainted with fraud. In other States, however, a distinction is-
drawn between fraudulent and non-fraudulent misconduct; and in
the latter class of cases they are liable to the bank alone, and not
to its creditors.2  This distinction must be noted at the outset, while
the soundness of it is reserved for later consideration.
II. The general rule of duty governing directors cannot be
expressed in a rigid form. In the earlier days, when business
methods were slower and simpler, the law maintained in a fairly
satisfactory manner boundaries in the care which individuals were
required to exercise while pursuing, under different conditions, their
office or employment. But business methods have become so com-
plex that many of these boundaries are disappearing. Between em-
ployers and employ6s, however, the courts are still spinning their
distinctions concerning duty and liability with ever-increasing fine-
ness, and thus enhancing the difficulty of both classes to know the
law which they are required to observe.
Though the courts no longer seek to measure the differences
in care by the old-fashioned rules of slight, ordinary and great, it
is difficult in comparing one act with another to avoid altogether
the use of these qualifying terms. One board of directors is more
attentive, more dutiful than another; and when their conduct is
compared, some words expressing the distinctions between them
must be used so long as these exist.
There are two ways of regarding the duty, care or attention
required of a board of directors. One way is to set up an abstract
standard or rule and apply this to the board of a particular bank,
whose conduct is the subject of legal inquiry. The other way is to
compare their conduct with that of another board which fulfills
the legal requirements. The law employs both methods; with what
results we shall soon know.
III. Two abstract rules have long competed for judicial ap-
proval and application. The first of these was declared in 1829
by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in Percy v. Millaudon,-the
earliest case of bank misdirection reviewed by a court in this country.
"The only correct mode of ascertaining whethet there was fault in
the director," says Justice Porter, 4 who delivered the opinion of
1Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52. See Secs. 17-20.
2Minton v. Stahlman, 96 Tenn. 98; Deadrick v. Bank, ioo Tenn. 457.
3See Sec. 20.
48 Martin (N. S.) 68, 73; Godbold v. Branch Bank, ii Ala. i91; Spering's
Appeal, 71 Pa. ii.
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the court, "is by inquiring whether he neglected the exercise of
that diligence and care which was necessary to a successful dis-
charge of the duty imposed on him. That diligence and care must
again depend on the nature of the undertaking. There are many
things which, in their management, require the utmost diligence,
and most scrupulous attention, "and where the agent who undertakes
their direction renders himself responsible for the slightest neglect.
There are others, where the duties imposed are presumed to call
for nothing more than ordinary care and attention, and where the
exercise of that degree of care suffices. The directors of banks
from the nature of their undertaking fall within the class last men-
tioned, while in the discharge of their ordinary duties."
IV. By the other rule directors must exrcise the same degree
of attention in conducting the business of their bank that is exer-
cised by prudent men in conducting their own affairs. In a recent
well-considered case the court 'thus stated the principle:' "It is
necessary for them to give the business under their care such atten-
tion as an ordinarily discreet business man would give to his own
concerns under similar circumstances, and it is therefore incumbent
upon them to devote so much of their time to their trust as is
necessary to familiarize them with the business of the institution
and to supervise and direct its operations."
V. The two rules regard the duty and liability of directors
from different points of view. The first, or minimum liability rule,
regards the matter from the director's side. He is indeed required
to exercise a general supervision, and fulfill a few specific statutory
requirements, but not much more. It is not expected that he will
devote much time to the affairs of the bank, as he is rarely paid
anything for his service, and generally is engaged in other and far
more important business. It is not reasonable to expect that he
will examine the books and other records, and without doing these
things he cannot know much about the details of the bank's affairs ;
1 Bartch, Ch. J., Warren v. Robison, 19 Utah 289, 303.
"I think the question in all such cases should and must necessarily be,
whether the directors have omitted that care which men of common prudence
take of their own concerns. To require more, would be adopting too rigid
a rule, and rendering them liable for slight neglect; while to require less
would be relaxing too much the obligation which binds them to vigilance
and attention in regard to the interests of those confided to their care, and
expose them to liability for gross neglect only-which is very little short of
fraud itself." Vice Chancellor McCoun. Scott v. Depeyster, i Edw. Ch.
(N. Y.) 513, 543.
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and this is supposed to be known by all who do business with
banking institutions.
The other rule regards the duty and liability of directors from
the public side. This view is forcibly expressed by Justice Earl, in
these words: "It seems to me that it would be a monstrous proposi-
tion to hold that trustees, intrusted with the management of the
property, interests and business of other people, who divest them-
selves of the management and confide in them, are bound to give
only slight care to the duties of their trust, and are liable only in
case of gross inattention and negligence; and I have found no
authority fully upholding such a proposition. It is true that authori-
ties are found which hold that trustees are liable only for crassa
negligentia, which literally means gross negligence; but that phrase
has been defined to mean the absence of ordinary care and diligence
adequate to the particular case. * * * Like a mandatary, to
whom he has been likened, he is bound not only to exercise proper
care and diligence, but ordinary skill and judgment. * * * These
defendants voluntarily took the position of trustees of the bank.
They invited depositors to confide to them their savings, and to
intrust the safe-keeping and management of them to their skill and
prudence. They undertook not only that they would discharge
their duties with proper care, but that they would exercise the
ordinary skill and judgment requisite for the discharge of their
delicate trust."1
Doubtless every court looks from both sides; but it is just as
certain that its judgment is often deflected from the rules to the
inculpated directors. The evidence against them is examined, an
opinion is formed of their guilt or innocence, and then a color or
modification, if necessary, is given to the rule, to fit it properly to
the facts. The numerous penumbra that surround the rules above
given are unquestionable proof of the working of the judicial mind
in these controversies.
VI. The other rule may be called the comparative one, and will
be stated in the words of Chief Justice Paxson :2 "Not the ordinary
'Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65, 72, 73. This statement of the maximum rule
has been more often quoted with approval than any other legal deliverance.
2Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. i4o.
In Wheeler v. Aiken Co. Loan & Say. Bank, 75 Fed. 781, 784, Judge
Brawley said: "The customs and methods of the community in which the
business is done are, for such community, a standard of prudence and dili-
gence by which the responsibility of bank officers and directors is to be
tested; and if there is ground to believe that there has been a reasonable
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care which a man takes of his own business, but the ordinary care
of a bank director in the business of a bank. Negligence is the
want of care according to the circumstances, and the circumstances
are everything considering the question."
By this rule the directorial standard of duty is the standard exist-
ing among the directors of other banks in the same city. In another
part of his opinion the Justice remarked: "If the director [on
trial] performed his duties as such in the same manner as they
were performed by all other directors of all other banks in the same
city, it could not be fairly said that he was guilty of gross negli-
gence."
The flaw in this rule is apparent. What board in a great city
is to serve as the measure or standard whereby to test the conduct
of a director? In every large city the boards differ greatly in
their interest, attendance, methods and efficiency. In a few banks
the attendance of their directors is large and regular, and a keen
interest is taken by them in all its affairs. Perhaps they are large
stockholders, and are fully impressed with the duties and liabilities
of their office. In other banks the interest is slight, the attendance
small and irregular, and the business, except a few ftatutory require-
ments, is entrusted to the managing officers.
This rule, therefore, as thus expressed, is singularly indefinite.
If Justice Paxson had said that the standard to be applied to a
director is that of the bank or banks whose directors take the deepest
interest and devote the most attention to their management, then
indeed the standard or measure would be definite and could be
learned and applied. But since the directors in a large city vary
so greatly in their interest, attendance and attention, the above stan-
dard of duty means very little, if anything, either in theory or
application.
VII. Having described the rules that apply to the conduct of
directors, the next step is to show how they have been applied. The
storm-center can be more easily reached by cutting off four large
classes of cases in which judicial decision has been essentially
harmonious.
The first class includes all cases in which the conduct of directors
is impregnated with fraud or bad faith. Fraud may have several
conformity t,- such methods and customs, and absolute good faith and honesty
of purpose, it would be unjust to hold to a personal accountability for loans
which subsequent events proved unwise." Judge Brawley goes further than
Justice Paxson for he adds to the local standard of conduct, "absolute good
faith and honesty of purpose."
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forms, active and passive, open and secret. If a director is wan-
tonly defrauding his bank there is no question concerning his lia-
bility. In a larger number of cases it assumes a less obvious form.
Many men are of a pacific temperament and dislike to quarrel; they
suffer physically and mentally by conflict. Then, too, for business
reasons they may fear to incur the enmity of their associates; and
are silent and inactive' when they should be outspoken and vigilant
in the discharge of their duty. So long as they are inattentive be-
cause their own business demands their time, they are not deemed
neglectful; indeed, if their inattention is due simply to inertia, or
disinclination to attend board meetings they are not regarded as
within the fatal range of liability. In like manner when they travel
abroad and for months do not meet with their associates the law
does not visit them with any penalty for their non-attendance.1
When, however, they keep silent or remain away because they
suspect or fear that the conduct of their bank is not proper, instead
of coming and seeking to correct the board, then they incur the
displeasure of the law; become in truth passive participants in the
wrong doing. So long as they honestly believe their associates are
doing their dnty, absentees cannot be holden on that ground al-
though, if they had come, they might have speedily unlearned their
delusion. There is no smell of fraud on their garments so long as
they have no wrongful suspicions. But the poison begins to work
as soon as they suspect, fear or learn that the directors are doing
wrong and they preserve silence or remain away to escape learning
more. In other words, as soon as a belief, fear or suspicion arises
in their minds, it is their duty to become active and make an in-
vestigation to find out the truth or falsity of it; and if there be any
foundation therefor, to strive for its correction, and, if failing, to
resign. Not to do this is to become in law a participant in the
fraud, and justly liable therefor.'
'See Sec. 16.
2Says Porter, J., in Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Martin (La., N. S.) 63, 65:
"If nothing has come to their knowledge to awaken suspicion of the fidelity
of the president and cashier, ordinary attention to the affairs of the institution
is sufficient. If they become acquainted with any part calculated to put
prudent men on their guard, a degree of care commensurate with the evil
to be avoided is required, and a want of that care certainly makes them
responsible." See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132.
In Martin v. Webb, IIO U. S. 15, the court said: "Directors cannot in
justice to those who deal with the bank, shut their eyes to what is going
on around them. It is their duty to use ordinary diligence in ascertaining
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VIII. Another approach toward the center may be made from
the opposite side. Directors who seek to do their duty are not
responsible for mistakes of law or fact." If before employing a
cashier they investigate his fitness, mental and moral, and are satis-
fied that he is competent, they are not responsible should he prove
to be otherwise. But if, after discovering his incompetency, or
unfitness, they continue him in office, unless temporarily while trying
to find another, they are liable for the consequences.'
the condition of its business, and to exercise reasonable control and super-
vision of its officers."
In Clews v. Bardon, 36 Fed. 617, 621, Bunn, J., said: "The [national]
banking act places their liability upon the true ground, and it stands about
as it would in the like circumstances at the common law. In either case the
director is bound to good faith. He must act honestly. He must not commit
fraud, nor be privy to it, nor willfully shut his eyes, and abstain from
making inquiries. If he has knowledge that an illegal transaction is to be
enacted by the officers in charge, and consents to it, or connives at it, or
willfully shuts his eyes, and permits it to be done, or is guilty of such gross
and willful neglect of duty as amounts to bad faith, he will be held
responsible."
For cases in which this rule has been applied or declared, see Godbold
v. Bank, ii Ala. 191; Bank of St. Marys v. St. John, 25 Ala. 566; Schley
v. Dixon, 24 Ga. 275; Dunn v. Kyle, 14 Bush (Ky.) 134; Brannin v. Loving,
82 Ky. 370; Fusz v. Spaunhorst, 67 Mo. 256; Delano v. Case, 121 Ill. 247;
Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 222; Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88
N. Y. 52; Cross v. Sackett, 2 Bos. (N. Y.) 617, 645; Spering's Appeal.
7i Pa. i i; Marshall v. Farmers & Mechanics' Say. Bank, 85 Va. 676; Minton
v. Stahlman, 96 Tenn. 98; Bartholomew v. Bentley, 15 Ohio 659; Scale v.
Baker, 70 Texas 283; Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311; Tate v. Bates, i18
N. C. 287; Briggs v. Spaulding, I41 U. S. 132; Robinson v. Hall, 12 C. C.
A. 674; Cooper v. Hill, 36 C. C. A. 402; Prescott v. Haughey, 65 Fed. 653.
'Godbold v. Bank, II Ala. 19I; Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 503;
United Society of Shakers v. Underwood, 9 Bush (Ky.) i; Graves v.
Lebanon Nat. Bank, Io Bush (Ky.) 23; Dunn v. Kyle, 14 Bush (Ky.) 134;
Ray v. Bank, io Bush (Ky.) 344; Savings Bank v. Caperton, 87 Ky. 306;
Jones v. Johnson, 86 Ky. 530; Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Martin (La., N. S.) 68;
Vance v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 4 Lea (Tenn.) 385; Wallace v. Lincoln Say.
Bank, 89 Tenn. 63o: Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479; Ackerman v.
Halsey, 37 N. J. Eq. 356, 363; Hodges v. New England Screw Co., i R. I.
312; Scott v. Depeyster, I Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 513; Manhattan Co. v. Lydig.
4 Johns. (N. Y.) 377; Marshall v. Farmers & Mechanics' Say. Bank. 85 Va.
676; Solomon v. Bates. 118 N. C. 311; Turquand v. Marshall, 4 Ch. App.
376. 386; Overend, Gurney & Co. v. Gurney, 4 Ch. App. 701; Giblin v.
McMullen, 2 P. C. 317; Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. ii.
2United Society of Shakers v. Underwood. 9 Bush (Ky.) 6o9; Ray v.
Bank, IO Bush 344; Graves v. Lebanon Nat. Bank, io Bush 23. 3o; Foster v.
Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479; Scott v. National Bank of Chester Valley. 72 Pa.
471; Giblin v. McMullen, 2 P. C. 317.
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Again, if they make mistakes in lending money and incur losses,
after exercising their best judgment, they are not liable,' nor are
they for legal mistakes,' especially when they have sought com-
petent advice.
In this category may be placed a large number of delinquencies
of a minor kind that do not affect their integrity or injure the bank,
which are not in any way vital to its successful operation, for ex-
ample, the failure, through inattention and not design, to make
reports, or reports less complete than the law requires.
IX. A third class of cases may be cut off, specific violations
of positive law. The conduct of directors on many of these occa-
sions is without a stain of fraud, but they are just as clearly liable
for knowingly and deliberately violating a clear, positive law where-
by others, confiding in their honesty and loyalty, have suffered.
Thus in nearly every State usury laws exist which limit the dis-
cretion of banks in lending money. The directors, for the sake of
enhancing the gains of their bank, determine to disregard the in-
hibition. They commit no moral fraud, and have not the slightest
intention of so doing; the law, standing in the way of greater profit,
is openly defied. A. higher rate is charged, but a greater risk is
taken, and the loan proves a loss. Had they obeyed the law and
been content with the legal rate, they would have found better
security, at all events they would have been within the pale of its
protection. By disregarding it, though with no thought of personal
gain distinct from the general gain to the bank, a loss is incurred.
Why should they not be held responsible for the loss? They have
violated a law which was enacted to prevent them from taking an
excessive risk, why should they not be held accountable for the dis-
aster? Their conduct was not an error of judgment, not a mistake,
but an open and wilful, though honest, defiance of the law, which
has brought loss in its train. Surely it is proper to visit them with
punishment for their deed.
Another illustration of the same kind is the lending to an in-
dividual of more than a prescribed part of the bank's capital. The
law was wisely designed, no one has the temerity to say it ought to
'Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 89 Tenn. 63o; Scott v. Depeyster, i
Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 513; Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. ii; Wetters v. Sowles,
31 Fed. i.2
.Vance v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 4 Lea (Tenn.) 385; Hodges v. New
England Screw Co., i R. I. 312; Godbold v. Branch Bank, ii Ala. 19i;
Harman v. Tappenden, i East (Eng.) 535. But see Marshall v. Farmers
& Mechanics' Say. Bank, 85 Va. 676, 683.
LIABILITY OF BANK DIRECTORS.
be changed; it was adopted in the interest Qf sound conservative
banking, to protect directors from yielding to the importunities of
their friends and from giving too free rein to their own judgment.
Surely if they violate it and losses follow, it is proper to. hold them
responsible for the violation.1
In the construction of violations of positive laws the courts have
again parted company over the question of intention or motive. If
the violation was intentional and premeditated, then all the courts
unite in holding the violators guilty; but if they did not seriously
consider the consequences of misdoing, acted blindly or indifferently
or without much thought of what they were doing, some tribunals
have overlooked their misdoing, notwithstanding that ancient and
salutary rule whereby every man is supposed to regard the conse-
quences of his own acts. If the courts themselves have too often
ignored its application in dealing with offenders of the common law,
there is less excuse for disregarding its application to offenders of
plain, sound, living statutes.
Illustrations of this rule are the sale of a special deposit ;2 the
payment of dividends out of capital ; the making of investments
or loans prohibited by law ;, the discounting of paper which is
known to be worthless;.' beginning business without the legal
amount of capital ;,6 accepting unauthorized securities in payment
of stock;' creating an indebtedness beyond the capital stock;' or
beyond a prescribed amount ;9 or the payment of an illegal tax.
Two other classes of specific violations require further con-
sideration. One of these is the receiving of deposits by directors
1Witters v. Sowles, 31 Fed. i; Witters v. Sowles, 43 Fed. 4o5; Stephens
v. Overstolz, 43 Fed. 465.
2 United Society of Shakers v. Underwood, 9 Bush (Ky.) 6og.
3 Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311; Gaffney v. Colvill, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 568;
United States v. Britton, io8 U. S. 199, 2o6; Hayden v. Thompson, 36
U. S. App. 361. See Houston v. Thornton, 122 N. C. 365.
JDodd v. Wilkinson, 42 N. J. Eq. affg. id. 234. See Wilkinson v.
Dodd, 4o N. J. Eq. 123 and 41 N. J. Eq. 566; Williams v. McKay, 46
N. J. Eq. 25; Joint Stock Co. v. Brown, 8 Eq. Cases 381; Dunn v. Kyle,
14 Bush (Ky.) 134; Cooper v. Hill, 36 C. C. A. 402.
ASavings Bank v. Caperton, 87 Ky. 3o6, 322.
OSchley v. Dixon, 24 Ga. 273; Trust Co. v. Floyd, 47 Ohio St. 525.
7 Moses v. Ocoee Bank, i Lea (Tenn.) 398.
8 Stone v. Chisolm, 113 U. S. 302; Hornor v. Henning, 93 U. S. 228;
Brannin v. Loving, 82 Ky. 370.
9
"White v. How, 3 McLean (Fed.) Iii; Hargroves v. Chambers, 3o Ga.
58o; Banks v. Darden, 18 Ga. 318.
'
0 Dodge v. Woolsey, I8 How. (U. S.) 331.
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when their bank is in an insolvent condition 1 To hold directors
liable for this act they must have actual as distinguished from
constructive knowledge. 2  But when their lack of knowledge is
the consequence of disregarding their duties then it furnishes no
defence.
The other class of specific violations are false reports or state-
ments by which others are misled and injured. In these cases the
injured creditor may maintain an action for deceit against the direc-
tors who made them. The two classes of cases in which such
actions have been most brought are by depositors 2 and purchasers
of stock.' Furthermore a director, even though not participating
in the fraud by signing the statement, is not, in all cases, relieved.'
Again, this remedy is not affected by the creation of another
by statute. The latter is simply cumulative and not destructive of
the other.s
Lastly the law will not permit a single creditor to appropriate
the entire liability of the directors for such a fraud to his exclusive
benefit.7
X. A fourth class of cases may be cut off, those relating to
the wrongful or neglectful exercise of authority. This may spring
'Cassidy v. Uhlman, 17o N. Y. 5o5; Cragie v. Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131;
Anonymous, 67 N. Y. 598; Chaffee v. Fort, 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 8r; Townsend
v. Williams, 117 N. C. 330; Tate v. Bates, 1i8 N. C. 287; Delano v. Case,
121 Ili. 247; Wolf v. Simmons, 75 Miss. 539, 541.
2Quin v. Earle, 95 Fed. 728; Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. v. Middlesex
Co. Bank, 6o N. J. Eq. 84; Stapleton v Odell, 21 N. Y. Misc. 94; Utley v.
Hill, I55 Mo. 232; State v. Tomblin, 57 Kan. 841; Minton v. Stahlman, 96
Tenn. 98.
SKillen v. Barnes, io6 Wis. 546; Seale v. Baker, 7o Texas 286; Kinkler
v. Junica, 84 Texas 1I6; Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287; Solomon v. Bates,
I18 N. C. 311; Cowley v. Smith, 46 N. J. Law 38o; Stuart v. Bank, 57
N. Y. 569; Prescott v. Haughey, 65 Fed. 653; Gerner v. Mosher, 58 Neb.
135. See Cowley case (supra) for mode of pleading in such actions.
4Cazeaux v. Mali, 25 Barb. 578; Cross v. Sackett, 2 Bos. (N. Y.) 617;
Morgan v. Skiddy, 62 N. Y. 325; Houston v. Thornton, 122 N. C. 365;
Gerner v. Mosher, 58 Neb. 135, reviewing many cases. Hubbard v. Weare,
79 Iowa 678; Salmon v. Richardson, 30 Conn. 36o; Prewett vr. Trimble, 92
Ky. 176; United States v. Allen, io Biss. (Fed.) 9o; Graves v. Lebanon
Nat. Bank, io Bush (Ky.) 23; Merchants Nat. Bank v. Thoms, 28 Ohio
Week. Law Bull. 164, citing many cases.
5Gerner v. Mosher, 58 Neb. 135, 145, i6o; Gerner v. Yates, 61 Neb. ioo.
But see Pier v. Hanmore, 86 N. Y. 95.
OStuart v. Bank, 57 Neb. 569; Prescott v. Haughey, 65 Fed. 653;
Houston v. Thornton, 122 N. C. 365. But see Utley v. Hill, 155 Mo. 232.7Bailey v. Mosher, ii C. C. A. 304, 307.
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from statute, or the common law, or both. If directors possess it,
they are justified in exercising it; if not the possessors, they are as
clearly guilty of usurpation, save in those cases in which they
honestly suppose, and with some reason, that in exercising it, they
are within the law.1 On the other hand, when directors are re-
quired to perform a specific duty, they cannot delegate its perform-
ance to others without incurring liability. Thus, in many States
directors are justified in delegating their authority to lend the bank's
money to the managing officers;2 in other States they must still
continue to perform this duty themselves.' Where the inhibition
prevails, they are as clearly guilty of negligence in not performing
this duty as in not signing reports, holding meetings or fulfilling
other positive requirements of the law.
Suppose a duty is rightfully delegated by the board to a
managing officer, and he in performing it violates the statute, are the
directors liable? Thus, a cashier was rightfully authorized to make
loans, but in exercising this atithority he violated the law forbidding
his bank from lending more than one-tenth of its capital to a bor-
rower. The directors were held not liable for the cashier's de-
liberate violation of the law.' Though this decision may be free
from criticism, I do not think the principle can be founded thereon
that in all cases in which directors can rightfully authorize a
"The directors cannot divest themselves of the duty of general super-
vision and control by committing this duty to [the cashier], but they properly
may intrust to him all the discretionary powers which usually appertain to
the immediate management of its business." Wallace, Ch. J., Warner v.
Penoyer, 33 C. C. A. 222, 226.
In the Penoyer case the board confided to a finance committee the duty
of lending the bank's money, who, in turn, sought to relieve themselves
from duty by confiding it wholly to the cashier who, in due time, wrecked
the bank. The court decided not to hold the board for delegating their duty
to the finance committee, but held the members of that committee responsible
for delegating their duty to the cashier. The court remarked that the board
was justified in supposing that the committee would attend to these duties
instead of shirking them and leaving all to a single officer.21n Warner v. Penoyer, 33 C. C. A. 222, 225, the court said: "The
directors of a national banking association are authorized to appoint a cashier
and delegate to him all the usual powers of such an officer, including the
discounting of notes." Land Credit Co. v. Lord Fermoy, 5 Ch. App. 763.3Union Nat. Bank v. Hill. 148 Mo. 380; Gibbons v. Anderson, 8o Fed.
345; Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630; Percy v. Millaudon, 3
La. 568; Wilkinson v. Dodd, 42 N. J. Eq. 234, 250, affd. id. 647; Houston
v. Thornton. 122 N. C. 365; Oakland Bank v. Wilcox, 6o Cal. 126.
4Clews v. Bardon, 36 Fed. 617.
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managing officer to make loans they are not responsible for his
conduct. They still have a supervisory power to perform, it is
the duty of the managing officer to report the loans he has made to
them and thus they know, or ought to know, what he is doing.
There is therefore clearly a limit to the principle of the non-liability
of directors for infractions of positive law by those whom they have
appointed to manage the business of their bank. Surely they
ought to be held for the violations that were known, or would
have been known, had they attended to their duties.' The rule,
therefore, in this class of cases is, directors are liable for violating
the statutes, and also for violations by those under their authority
when they knew or ought to have known what they were doing.2
XI. In applying the rules of duty and liability in the cases
described not much difficulty has arisen. When fraud has existed,
it has generally been discovered and punished. When directors
have erred in employing officers or in making loans, or mistaken the
law, the courts have not been greatly troubled in learning the truth.
When directors have violated the statutes, whatever their intention,
in most cases the violations were too plain to be ignored. Appointed
to execute the law, the courts have not hesitated to enforce a plain
command.
XII. The four classes of cases above mentioned may be con-
sidered from another point of view. Though everywhere regarded
as cases of negligence, they possess another character. When com-
mitting frauds directors are just the opposite from negligent; they
are too active. Indeed, the cases of real negligence do not relate
to frauds, to violations of law, to usurpations of authority, but
rather to the mode or manner of exercising authority. Negligence
among bank directors is, in truth, chiefly neglect-neglect to do the
things required of them, or to do them in a proper manner.
XIII. Eliminating all questions of fraud, mistake and specific
violations of law, the cases that cover the remaining central ground
are not so numerous perhaps as many imagine. It is easy enough
to put them into classes relating to loans,3 employment of officers4
examination of books, and the like,* but nothing would be gained
Gibbons v. Anderson, 8o Fed. 345.21n Brannin v. Loving, 82 Ky. 370, the directors did not know that the
president had violated the law.
'Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Martin (La., N. S.) 68; Brannin v. Loving, 82
Ky. 370.
4United Society of Shakers v. Underwood, 9 Bush (Ky.) 6og.5Directors are not liable for not detecting fraudulent entries made by
their cashier in the bank books extending through a period of nine years.
Savings Bank v. Caperton, 87 Ky. 3o6.
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by presenting such a classification. The same inquiry-runs through
them all; how, or in what manner was the authority of the directors
exercised? Were they negligent or not in making the loan, in
employing the officer, in retaining him after learning of his unfit-
ness, in not examining the books more frequently, or more thor-
oughly? As this inquiry is first, one of fact; and afterward, the
application of the rule of duty thereto,-the answer in one case is
not conclusive in another; for the facts are never quite the same.
Nevertheless, we may inquire, cannot a general rule of duty be
formulated to apply to directors, and not leave them entirely to the
judgment of the court in each particular case? A negative con-
clusion has been declared by the Supreme Court of the United
States. If a director is guilty of fraud, or of violating a statute,
or of executing his authority, he is clearly liable. Beyond this he
may be liable for something more, but precisely what cannot be told
until the matter comes before the court for determination.
It is true that this was another five to four decision, and the
minority, unwilling to confess their inability to prescribe a rule of
conduct for directors, declared that "as to the degree of diligence
and the extent of supervision to be exercised by directors, there
can be no room for doubt under the authorities. It is such diligence
and supervision as the situation and the nature of the business
requires. Their duty is to watch over and guard the interests
committed to them. In fidelity to their oaths, and to the obligations
they assume, they must do all that reasonably prudent and careful
men ought to do for the protection of others intrusted to their
charge."'
The Supreme Court of the United States is not the only tribunal
maintaining this despairing opinion. In a recent case the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire2 has declared that "the decisions in other
jurisdictions, attempting to establish inflexible rules whereby it shall
be settled that the existence of certain facts establishes a charge of
negligence as a matter of law, are not entitled to the weight to which
they would be if such views of the law prevailed in this State.
The question of negligence, being here regarded as one of fact,
is to be determined in the light of all the circumstances peculiar to
the particular case." It was accordingly held that the directors of
a bank were not liable for the defalcations of its cashier which
'Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, 170. In this case. the court de-
clared that the directors must exercise supervision, but this was precisely
what they did not do. yet by the majority were held not responsible.2Ricker v. Hall, 69 N. H. 592.
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occurred after learning of his indulgence in prior unsuccessful
speculations. Though the courts elsewhere, perhaps without ex-
ception,1 have held directors liable for the evil consequences attend-
ing the retention of a cashier or other officer after they knew he was
speculating, the New Hampshire decision is a not unexpected de-
liverance for a court which is guided solely by its own light, regard-
less of the rules and reasonings of other tribunals.
The rule of duty and liability declared in Briggs v. Spaulding
has been reluctantly followed by the lower federal courts in subse-
quent cases. The remarks on several occasions clearly reveal that
their real opinion was quite different from that which they were
required to adopt and apply.2 Remembering therefore that four
of the nine judges who decided the case entertained a different
view, that most of the federal judges in subsequent cases have fol-
lowed it from necessity and not from conviction of its soundness,
that with very few exceptions it has encountered the disapproval
of the State tribunals, is it unreasonable to suppose that the question
would receive the same answer should it ever be reviewed?
XIV. In the central zone, therefore, is left a class of cases of
pure negligence. They are not tainted with fraud, they are not
excusable mistakes, they are not violations either intentional or
unintentional of any statutory requirement. They fall into two
divisions. In the first are included the cases in which the negligence
of directors, while stopping outside the door of fraud, is gross and
without excuse. In the second class of cases, the negligence is not
so great.
The negligent directors included in the second division are not
regarded culpable by any courts; the directors included in the first
division are regarded guilty by some courts, and not by others.
With respect to these the courts are in hopeless conflict. Those
which relieve directors apply either the first standard of duty and
liability above described; or else determine each case, as was done
by the supreme federal court in Briggs v. Spaulding, by itself. The
'In Scott v. National Bank of Chester Valley, 72 Pa. .471, 480, the
court well said: "No officer in a bank, engaged in stock-gambling, can be
safely trusted, and the evidence of this is found in the numerous defaulters,
whose peculations have been discovered to be directly traceable to this
species of gambling. * * * Any evidence of stock-gambling, or dangerous
outside operations, should be visited with immediate dismissal." A similar
view was taken in Preston v. Pratter, 137 U. S. 6o4. See Cutting v.
Marlor, 78 N. Y. 454.
2Warner v. Penoyer, 33 C. C. A. 222, 228; Mutual Building Fund &Say. Bank v. Bosseiux, 3 Fed. 817: Robinson v. Hall, 12 C. C. A. 674.
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courts which condemn them apply the rule of liability laid down by
Justice Earl. It may be added that the rule holding directors liable
for gross negligence, even though untainted by fraud, commands
wider assent and is believed to be more salutary in its operation.
Cases in which the maximum rule has been applied:
Alabama. Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 503.
Illinois. Delano v. Case, 17 Ill. App. affd., 121 Ill. 247.
Indiana. Coddington v. Canaday, 157 Ind. 243.
Kentucky. United Society of Shakers v. Underwood, 9 Bush 6o9;
Jones v. Johnson, IO Bush 649; Ray v. Bank, IO Bush 344; Dunn
v. Kyle, 14 Bush 134; Brannin v. Loving, 82 Ky. 370; Jones v.
Johnson, 86 Ky. 530; Savings Bank v. Caperton, 87 Ky. 3o6.
Minnesota. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. Ryan, 42 Minn. 196, citing
Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65.
Michigan. Commercial Bank v. Chatfield, 121 Mich. 641.
Missouri. Union Nat. Bank v. Hill, 148 Mo. 380.
New Jersey. Ackerman v. Halsey, 37 N. J. Eq. 356; Dodd v.
Wilkinson, 42 N. J. Eq. 647, affg. id. 234; Williams v. McKay,
46 N. J. Eq. z5, 56; Williams v. McKay, 4o N. J. Eq. 189,
revsg. 38 N. Y. Eq. 373.
New York. Cassidy v. Uhlman, 17o N. Y. 505; Hun v. Cary, 82
N. Y. 65; Bloom v. National Say. & Loan Co., 81 Hun 121, 123.
Nebraska. Gemer v. Mosher, 58 Neb. 135.
North Carolina. Townsend v. Williams, 117 N. C. 330; Tate v.
Bates, 118 N. C. 287; Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311.
Ohio. Meisse v. Loren, 6 Ohio Dec. 253.
Tennessee. Shea v. Mabry, i Lea 319, 342; Hume v. Commercial
Bank, 9 Lea 728; Minton v. Staliman, 96 Tenn. 98; Wallace v.
Lincoln Say. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630; Deadrick v. Bank, ioo Tenn.
457, 463.
Texas. Seale v. Baker, 70 Texas 283.
Virginia. Marshall v. Farmers & Mechanics' Say. Bank, 85 Va.
676.
Utah. Warren v. Robinson, 19 Utah 289.
Cases in which minor rule of liability was applied
Louisiana. Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Martin (N. S.) 68.
Pennsylvania. Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. ii; Swentzel v. Penn
Bank. 147 Pa. 140: Maisch v. Saving Fund, 5 Phila. 30.
Wisconsin. Killen v. Barnes, iO6 Wis. 546, 574; North Hudson
Building & Loan Asso. v. Childs, 82 Wis. 460.
Federal. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132.
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XV. There is another phase of the subject worthy of notice, the
narrowing of the responsibility of- directors by reason of the ex-
tension. of the authority of managing officers. Of late years, in
the large cities especially, the lending of a bank's money has been
almost wholly done by a committee, or more often by the president
or by two or three officers. The quicker methods of modem business
demand this change. In imposing this most important duty on the
managing officer, the directors in almost every State have the sanc-
tion of law. Formerly this waT the paramount duty of directors.
In this direction, therefore, to the extent that their duty has been
legally lightened, their corresponding liability has disappeared.'
But directors cannot relieve themselves entirely from responsibility
by thus delegating their duties to a manager or committee. When
they are charged with specific duties, these, as we have seen, must
be performed. They are personal and cannot be transferred. How
far they can go depends on the statute or charter which is the basis
of the bank's existence and authority.
XVI. Lastly may be considered the question, what judgment
may be visited on absent directors? If one is ill his non-attendance
is excused; furthermore, a bank may give a leave of absence to a
director who is sick, even though he be the president, expecting
or hoping that he will recover and resume his duties. Not infre-
quently directors are elected for the purpose of strengthening the
bank, gaining business, who live far away and are not expected to
aid their associates by their presence and advice, or only on rare
occasions. But we are now approaching dangerous ground. For,
if all were excused because they were too busy to attend, the direc-
tion of the bank would pass entirely to the president, or a few of
the leading officers. It is not proper for the directors to confide
entirely the direction of their bank to its managers, however
competent and worthy of confidence they may be, but to what extent
attendance is a positive duty that cannot be neglected without
rendering the absentee liable for the ill consequences is an open
question and perhaps must always remain open for special answer.2
'See Warner v. Penoyer, 33 C. C. A. 222, 225.
2Briggs v. Spaulding, i4i U. S. I32. See North Hudson Building &
Loan Asso. v. Childs, 82 Wis. 460, 478, and Wheeler v. Aiken Co. Loan &
Say. Bank, 75 Fed. 781, 782.
In Warren v. Robinson, ig Utah 289, Bartch, Ch. J., says: "A director
is not responsible for acts committed, transactions made, or losses incurred
before he became a member of the board, or for any act of the board alone in
his absence and without his knowledge and assent." This is the English
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XVII. The wrongs of directors are primarily done to their
bank, which can sue them in an action at law for their misdoing. '
But it often happens that the bank is in complete possessioi of the
directors who are unwilling to proceed against themselves. Indeed,
it can hardly be expected that they will transform themselves from
mismanagers into reformers and prosecutors. But, if unwilling,
the stockholders have a standing in a court of equity to sue in their
own names making the bank a party defendant.2
. XVIII. Too often the mismanagement of directors ends in the
failure of their bank, and then the assignee or receiver succeeds to
rule. In re Cardiff Savings Bank, 2 Ch. Div. ioi; In re Denham & Co.,
25 Ch. Div. 752. See also Land Credit Co. v. Lord Fermoy, 5 Ch. App.
763. In Banks v. Dardon, 18 Ga. 318, absence and dissent when present
did not relieve the directors. And in the recent case of Houston v. Thornton,
122 N. C. 365, 373, the Supreme Court of North Carolina said: "There is
no principle of law or morals that will permit the selection of non-resident
directors of good character, whose names shall be a pledge of honest manage-
ment upon which the public shall make deposits and buy the stock of the
bank, and then when the crush comes will excuse such directors from liability
because, being non-residents, they could not give proper attention to their
duties, and by private arrangement it was agreed that they should not be
required to do so. Such arrangement, if it had been shown, would not have
released them from their duties as prescribed by Act of Congress, nor from
their common law liability for negligence or fraud."
Directors who are elected but do not accept are not liable. Maisch v.
Saving Fund. 5 Phila. 30; Hume v. Commercial Bank, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 728.
'Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65; Bloom v. National Say. & Loan Co., 81
Hun 120; O'Brien v. Fitzgerald, 143 N. Y. 374; Meisse v. Loran, 6 Ohio
N. P. 307; Ackerman v. Halsey, 37 N. J. Eq. 356; Conway v. Halsey, 44
N. J. Law 462; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. Ryan, 42 Minn. 196; National
Bank v. Vade, 84 Fed. io.
2Greaves v. Gonge, 69 N. Y. 155; Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige (N. Y.)
222: Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. 539; Smith v. Dorn, 96 Cal. 73; Higgins v.
Lansingh, 154 Ill. 301; Knoop v. Bohmrich, 23 Atl. 118; Craig v. Craig, 83
Pa. ig.
"The liability of the directors of corporations for violations of their
duty or breach of the trust committed to them, and the jurisdiction of courts
of equity to afford redress to the corporation, and in proper cases to its
shareholders, for such wrongs, exist independently of any statute. * * *
This jurisdiction has been continually exercised in England and in this
country and is not of statutory origin." Rapallo, J., Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick.
88 N. Y. 52, 58, 59.
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all its rights and liabilities and he may proceed against the directors.
In a large number of cases he has been the suing party.'
XIX. If a bank is insolvent and the assignee or receiver de-
clines to sue the directors, then all the stockholders, or one or more
in behalf of all can proceed in equity against them.'
XX. In many cases the creditors proceed against the directors.
Once this could not be done because no legal relation of any kind:
was recognized as existing between them.' The claims of cred-
itors were against the bank, and the bank only could proceed against
the directors for their misdeeds. The fact that the damages re-
covered by the bank of the directors would go immediately to its
creditors did not justify the latter, so the courts once thought, in
their attempt to recover directly from the directors themselves. And
this view is still maintained by some tribunals.4 But the more gen-
'Thompson v. Greeley, io7 Mo. 577; Union Nat. Bank v. Hill, 148 Mo.
38o, 393; Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 70; Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52;
O'Brien v. Fitzgerald, 143 N. Y. 377; Higgins v. Tefft, 4 N. Y. App. Div.
62; Dykman v. Keeney, 21 N. Y. App. Div. 114; Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige
(N. Y.) 23o; Hume v. Commercial Bank, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 744; Wallace v.
Lincoln Say. Bank, 39 Tenn. 63o, 637; Savings Bank v. Caperton, 87 Ky.
3o6; Jones v. Johnson, 86 Ky. 530; Williams v. Halliard, 34 N. J. Eq. 341;
Gibbons v. Anderson, 8o Fed. 345.2Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52; Greaves v. Gouge, 69 N. Y.
154; Sayles v. White, I8 N. Y. Div. 59o; Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige
(N. Y.) 23o; Jones v. Johnson, io Bush (Ky.) 649; Hickens v. Congreve, 4
Russ. (Eng.) 574; Union Nat. Bank v. Hill, 148 Mo. 380, 394.3Zinn v. Mendel, 9 W. Va. 58o; Smith v. Hurd, 12 Met. (Mass.) 371;.
Smith v. Poor, 4o Me. 415; Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456; Landis v. Sea
Isle City Hotel Co., 31 Atl. (N. J.). This case contains the fullest con-
sideration of the rule of any modern case. See opinion of Court of Errors,
affirming the Vice Chancellor, 53 N. J. Eq. 654; Savings Bank v. Caperton,
87 Ky. 3o6; Jones v. Johnson, IO Bush (Ky.) 649; Winter v. Baker, 34
How. Pr. 183; Gardner v. Pollard, io Bos. (N. Y.) 674; Abbott v. Merriam,
8 Cush. (Mass.) 588; Conway v. Halsey, 44 N. J. Law 462.4Savings Bank v. Caperton, 87 Ky. 3o6, 323. In this case the court
remarked that the directors were under no personal liability to the creditors
of a bank by reason of a neglect of duty; that they were the agents of the
corporation and could be sued by the creditors only because of the assignee's
refusal. But when "the directors are the parties to be charged there is no
reason why the creditor may not sue, making the bank and the directors the
defendant in this case for a neglect of duty."
Bank of St. Mary's v. St. John, 25 Ala. 566. This is one of the earlier
American cases and the court held that the creditors of the bank, which wasinsolvent, could proceed in equity against the directors without first obtaining
a judgment at law for the amount of their debt.
Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311, 320; Ackerman v. Halsey, 37 N. J. Eq.
356; Meisse v. Loren, 5 Ohio N. P. 307, 309; Gager v. Paul, iIi Wis. 638;.
Killen v. Barnes, io6 Wis. 546.
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eral rule is in cases where neither the bank, nor its assignee or
receiver, nor its stockholders can or will proceed at all, or
to less advantage than the creditors, they are not denied a remedy
against the directors. In thus acting, though the fruits of their
action are to be wholly or in part retained by themselves, they act
as a substitutionary party for the bank, or its assignee, receiver or
stockholders. Regarding this as the correct view, the objection that
creditors cannot proceed against the directors because the former are
in no sense the trustees of the latter, disappears. It is an objection
raised to a shadow which would have never troubled the judicial
mind had it looked at the true relations of the parties.
On another ground the creditors' right to proceed against the
directors is not less secure to them. The liability of the directors
is a trust fund belonging to the bank which the creditors have a
right to follow and apply in discharge of its indebtedness to them-
selves.
The only question pertaining to the remedial rights of creditors
is that of precedence over the receiver, assignee or stockholder. In
practice, there has been but little difficulty, for as the object of the
proceeding in any case is to obtain the means to *satisfy creditors,
they are quite willing for other parties to enforce measures against
the directors to compel them to respond instead of introducing and
enforcing measures themselves.
With this conception of the proceedings undertaken by creditors
against directors, the distinction between the rule of duty and lia-
bility of directors to the bank and to its creditors, stated at the
beginning of this inquiry, crumbles away.
Albert S. Bolles.
